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Cosmopolitanism

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Abstract and Keywords

This article discusses several types of cosmopolitanisms and their commitments and implications. It first discusses the origins of the idea of cosmopolitanism and some contemporary theses typically associated with cosmopolitanism—that it includes both a thesis about identity and one about responsibility. It then distinguishes cosmopolitanism from some concepts closely associated with it, and discusses the connections among the ideas of cosmopolitanism, globalization, and global justice. The next sections distinguish varieties of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan justice. One cannot fully understand the arguments of prominent cosmopolitans, especially concerning cosmopolitan justice, without understanding the debate between Rawls and his critics about *The Law of Peoples*, so this is discussed next. Finally, the article assesses whether cosmopolitanism is compatible with other commitments that fill human lives with meaning.

Keywords: cosmopolitanisms, identity, responsibility, globalization, global justice, cosmopolitan justice, Rawls, The Law of the Peoples

ON one common account of what cosmopolitanism is, the key idea is that every person has global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern and is therefore entitled to equal respect and consideration no matter what her citizenship status or other affiliations happen to be. If this is interpreted to mean (as it sometimes is) that national, ethnic, or local attachments are therefore irrelevant to questions of distribution, fairness, and equality, this would seem to set cosmopolitanism on a collision course with the views of most people in the world. For many people, individual identity crucially depends on national or ethnic identity, a sense of cultural, religious, or racial belonging, and is characterized by strong attachments to local communities, neighborhoods, friends, and, of course, families. Are these affinities and partialities necessarily in tension with cosmopolitan views of our universal entitlements? And if they are, does this not mean so much the worse for cosmopolitanism? In order to see why there is not necessarily the

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conflict imagined, in this chapter I discuss several types of cosmopolitanisms and their commitments and implications. I also give the reader a sense of other current debates in the field of cosmopolitanism.

This article is structured as follows. In the next section I discuss the origins of the idea of cosmopolitanism and some contemporary theses typically associated with cosmopolitanism—that it includes both a thesis about identity and one about responsibility. In the following section I distinguish cosmopolitanism from some concepts closely associated with it and discuss the connections among the ideas of cosmopolitanism, globalization, and global justice. The next sections distinguish varieties of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan justice. One cannot fully understand the arguments of prominent cosmopolitans, especially concerning cosmopolitan justice, without understanding the debate between Rawls and his critics about *The Law of Peoples*, so we discuss that next. Finally, we are in (p. 583) a position to assess whether cosmopolitanism is compatible with other commitments that fill human lives with meaning, and that is discussed in the last section.

The Cosmopolitan as a Citizen of the World

Early proponents of cosmopolitanism included the Cynic, Diogenes, and Stoics such as Cicero (Nussbaum 1996).¹ These cosmopolitans rejected the idea that one should be primarily defined by one's city of origin, as was typical of Greek males of the time. Rather, they insisted that they were “citizens of the world.” The Stoics' idea of being a citizen of the world neatly captures the two main aspects of cosmopolitanism, especially as it is frequently understood today. These are a thesis about identity and one about responsibility. As a thesis about identity, being a cosmopolitan indicates that one is a person who is marked or influenced by various cultures. Depending on attitudes to the various influences or markings, the word “cosmopolitanism” could have both negative and positive connotations. It has had positive connotations when, for instance, it has been thought to mean that a person is worldly and well traveled rather than narrow-minded or provincial. It has had more negative connotations, for instance, in the case of Jews and Bolsheviks, who, at one time, were considered to be dirty or foreigners, a threat to the community's purity (Synowich 2005, 56). Cosmopolitanism as a thesis about identity also denies that membership in a particular cultural community is *necessary* for an individual to flourish in the world. Contra Will Kymlicka's prominent claims on the matter, cosmopolitans deny that such membership is necessary for an individual's having a social identity or her living a fulfilling life (Waldron 1992). Belonging to a particular culture is not an essential ingredient in personal identity formation or maintenance: one can pick and choose from the full smorgasbord on offer, or reject all in favor of other options, as Waldron maintains.

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Cosmopolitanism as a thesis about responsibility generates much discussion, as we will come to see.² Roughly, the idea is that as a cosmopolitan, one should appreciate that one is a member of a global community of human beings. As such, one has responsibilities to other members of the global community. As Martha Nussbaum elaborates, one owes allegiance “to the worldwide community of human beings,” and this affiliation should constitute a primary allegiance (Nussbaum 1996, 4). As a thesis about responsibility, cosmopolitanism guides (p. 584) the individual outward from local obligations, and prohibits those obligations from crowding out responsibilities to distant others.

Cosmopolitanism highlights the responsibilities we have to those whom we do not know and with whom we are not intimate, but whose lives should be of concern to us. The borders of states, and other boundaries considered to restrict the *scope* of justice, are irrelevant roadblocks in appreciating our responsibilities to all in the global community.

Globalization and Global Justice

Talk about cosmopolitanism is often closely aligned with discourse about globalization and global justice. These are, in general, different topics entirely, but often have strong points of intersection, as we see.

What is the subject matter of global justice? What is the field of global justice concerned with or what should it be about? If we examine actual global justice movements in the world, as represented by (say) the World Social Forum,³ the first thing we might notice is that there are a number of quite different groups that can be identified as concerned with issues of global justice. To pick out just a few, these include trade unionists, farmers, indigenous peoples, environmentalists, and so forth. They often have common grievances and points of resistance, such as opposition to the way globalization is unfolding in the world today, the dominance of multinational corporations or economic interests throughout the globe with a feared withering away of local cultures, devastation for local economies, intensified destruction of the environment, deepening exploitation, the apparent unconcern with the most vulnerable and marginalized, and so forth. Though members of the so-called Global Justice Movement have common points of struggle, they often resist congealing into an overarching political program, despite occasional victories (such as those achieved at, or represented by, the World Social Forum). A central claim made by some of these marginalized groups is that they want to be left alone. Perhaps despairing of ever getting any meaningful chance to be given a real voice and input in decisions that crucially affect them, perhaps also skeptical given bad histories of interference, domination, or oppression, given their current and expected future marginalization, they (apparently) frequently ask now simply to be left alone to live their lives as they see fit. Others, perhaps more hopeful about what their activism can accomplish, demand changes to our global governance arrangements (such as the rules governing the World Trade Organization). Chief among (p. 585) these would be changes

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that take more seriously fairness for the world's worst off and most vulnerable, by distributing the costs and benefits of globalization more evenly.

Academic theorizing about global justice has, in some important ways, been more narrowly focused, though it does incorporate the concerns of such activists. Theorizing about global justice has been dominated by issues of global distributive justice over the last two decades or so, though this is not to say that other issues have been entirely neglected. Various theorists advocate different models of global justice that might consist of several components, such as advocating that every person be well positioned to enjoy the prospects for a decent life; a more equal distribution of resources globally or that every person have enough to meet her basic needs; more global equality of opportunity; universal promotion of human rights; promotion of the autonomy of peoples who stand in relations of equality with one another; or criteria governing intervention, especially military intervention, in the affairs of states. There is also much debate about how best to realize the desired elements, what principles should govern our interactions at the global level, and how to improve the management of our global affairs, including how best to govern globalization. Contemporary theorizing on global justice has been enormously influenced by John Rawls's work, especially his *The Law of Peoples*, and the position known as "Cosmopolitanism," which is discussed in more detail below.

For the antiglobalization movement, cosmopolitanism is sometimes feared because it is construed as another way to justify the relentless spread of capitalism throughout the globe and the liberal discourse associated with cosmopolitan values is nothing more than global capitalism's useful handmaiden. This view involves a misconception about the diversity of positions that are rightly construed as cosmopolitan. One could see oneself as a member of a global community of human persons for all sorts of reasons, such as religious commitments—Christianity is often thought of in this connection—and there is also a strong Marxist justification for holding this position as well. There is no need to suspect at the outset that talk of cosmopolitanism necessarily entails commitment to neo-liberal, capitalist views about economic justice. The question of what cosmopolitan justice entails is very much a current topic of debate, with people defending a full spectrum of views. Indeed, the critical mass of scholars actively working on the topic today endorse forms of egalitarianism that would be quite antithetical to the neo-liberal agenda, as I discuss.

There are economic forms of cosmopolitanism, some proponents of which advocate free trade (these include Adam Smith and Milton Friedman). However, there are also as many communist and socialist versions of economic cosmopolitanism as well (as advocated by, say, Marx, Engels, and Lenin), which encourages proletarians of the world to unite and to recognize their common interests in promoting a global economic order more aligned with workers' interests rather than those of capital. What is cosmopolitan about both of these familiar economic views is simply the idea that the preferred economic model transcends the boundaries of (p. 586) a nation-state. Current debates about what cosmopolitan justice consists in typically bypass the debate about modes of production.

Varieties of Cosmopolitanism

Several distinctions are in use in the literature and it may be useful to review these next.

Moral and Institutional Cosmopolitanism

The crux of the idea of moral cosmopolitanism is that every person has global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern and is therefore entitled to equal consideration no matter what her citizenship or nationality status. Thomas Pogge gives a widely cited synopsis of what are thought to be the key ideas:

Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, individualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons—rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally—not merely to some sub-set, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality: this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone—not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like. (Pogge 1992, 48–49)

Cosmopolitanism's force is best appreciated by considering what it rules out. For instance, it rules out positions that attach no moral value to some people, or weights the moral value some people have differentially according to their race, ethnicity, or nationality. Furthermore, assigning ultimate rather than derivative value to collective entities such as nations or states is prohibited. If such groups matter, they matter because of their importance to individual human persons rather than because they have some independent, ultimate (say, ontological) value.

A common misconception is that cosmopolitanism requires a world state or government. A distinction is sometimes drawn in the literature between moral and institutional cosmopolitanism (also referred to in the literature variously as “legal” or “political” cosmopolitanism). Institutional cosmopolitans maintain that fairly deep institutional changes are needed to the global system in order to realize the cosmopolitan vision adequately (Cabrera 2004; Held 1995). Moral cosmopolitans need not endorse that view; in fact, many are against radical institutional transformations (Nussbaum 2006). Cosmopolitan justice requires that our global obligations (such as protecting everyone's basic human rights or ensuring everyone's capabilities are met to the required threshold) are effectively discharged. However, (p. 587) a number of suitable arrangements might do this effectively. There are various possibilities for global governance that would not amount to a world state. These include mixtures of delegating responsibilities for particular domains to various institutions, with multiple agencies able to hold each other

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accountable, and other ways of reconfiguring the structure of governance bodies at the global level (such as the United Nations) so they are brought into line better with cosmopolitan goals (Held 1995; Weinstock 2006; Grant and Keohane 2005).

Extreme versus Moderate Cosmopolitanism

This terminology was initially introduced by Samuel Scheffler (2001 115–119). Using this terminology, Scheffler actually distinguishes at least two forms of cosmopolitanisms, giving rise to two distinctions. One concerns the *justificatory basis* of cosmopolitanism and the other concerns the content of what cosmopolitan justice consists in. An extreme cosmopolitan with respect to *justification* considers the underlying source of value to be cosmopolitan and it is with respect to cosmopolitan principles, goals, or values that all other principles of morality must be justified. A moderate cosmopolitan can take a more pluralistic line on the source of value, admitting that some noncosmopolitan principles, goals, or values may have ultimate value as well. In particular, moderate cosmopolitans need not reduce our special obligations to principles of cosmopolitan value, which might be construed as devaluing and distorting the meaning of the special attachments that people have (Scheffler 2001, 115; Tan 2004, 2005).

We can best appreciate the force of the second kind of cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitanism about the *content of justice*, by considering the question: are there any norms of justice that apply within an individual society and not to the global population at large? The extreme cosmopolitan denies that there are *at the level of fundamental principle*, whereas the moderate cosmopolitan believes that this is possible. On this latter view, principles of social justice are constrained but not replaced by principles of global justice (Scheffler 2001, 116; Miller 2007).

Weak versus Strong Cosmopolitanism

The way in which this distinction is typically drawn (e.g., Miller 2000, 174) is that weak cosmopolitanism underwrites, as requirements of justice, only the conditions that are universally necessary for human beings to lead minimally decent lives, whereas strong cosmopolitans are committed to a more demanding form of global distributive equality that will aim to eliminate inequalities between persons beyond some account of what is sufficient to live a minimally decent life. So, what is weak or strong on this account is the extent of one's commitments to redistribution.

(p. 588) While this distinction does have some value in distinguishing positions in the literature, it also glosses over other issues that seem just as important. If, for instance, one endorses a relational view of equality, such that what matters about equality is people's standing in relations of equality to one another, that is to say, in relations characterized by equal respect and lacking domination or oppression—having equal standing, for short—is this a weak or a strong form of cosmopolitanism? Presumably to

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answer that question we will need to look at the distributive implications of such a view. Let us say they demand redistribution up to the lower threshold but not beyond. It looks like we have a weak form of cosmopolitanism. But, its proponents might object, this classification as “weak” is pejorative and misleading if indeed it is the proper account of that with which cosmopolitanism should rightly be concerned. Furthermore, this distinction seems to exclude almost no one with defensible views on global justice. Even Rawls ends up as a weak cosmopolitan on this account (a label he himself explicitly rejected). This distinction needs to be replaced with more nuanced ones to play some continuing, useful role in the literature.

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Cosmopolitan justice can be argued for from a number of theoretical perspectives. After all, there are different conceptions of how to treat people equally especially with respect to issues of distributive justice, and this is often reflected in these different accounts. Cosmopolitan justice could be argued for along various lines, including utilitarian (prominently Singer 1972), rights-based accounts (Shue 1980; Jones 1999; Pogge 2002), Kantian lines (O'Neill 2000), Aristotelian (Nussbaum 2000, 2006), and contractarian (Beitz 1979; Pogge 1994; Moellendorf 2002). In recent years, one popular way of arguing for cosmopolitan justice has taken contractarian forms, following a very prominent debate between John Rawls and his critics. Because of its enormous dominance in current debates on cosmopolitan justice, I discuss this next.

Rawls's *Law of Peoples* and Some of His Prominent Cosmopolitan Critics

In *A Theory of Justice*, John Rawls sets out to derive the principles of justice that should govern liberal societies and, by employing all the apparatus attached to the original position (the hypothetical choosing situation used to select principles of justice in which we are deprived of knowledge of who we are in society), he famously (p. 589) endorsed two principles; namely, one protecting equal basic liberties and a second permitting social and economic inequalities when (and only when) they are both to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (the Difference Principle) and attached to positions that are open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle). In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls's focus is on the principles that should govern closed communities—paradigmatically, nation-states. Cosmopolitans such as Charles Beitz (1979) and then Thomas Pogge (1989) argued that these two principles should apply globally. After all, if the point of the veil of ignorance is to exclude us from knowledge of factors that are morally arbitrary, surely where one happens to have been

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born (or citizenship) qualifies as one of those quintessentially arbitrary factors from the moral point of view?

It was something of a disappointment, then, when Rawls later weighed in on the issue explicitly against such a suggestion. He argued that, though the two principles should apply within liberal societies, they should not apply across them. Rather, in the international arena, Rawls thinks different principles would be chosen (in a second original position occupied by representatives of different, well-ordered peoples) and these would include principles acknowledging peoples' independence, their equality, that they have a right to self-defense, and that they have duties of nonintervention, to observe treaties, to honor a limited set of rights, to conduct themselves appropriately in war, and to assist other peoples living in unfavorable conditions. In the space provided, I cannot do justice to all the complexities of Rawls's sophisticated account, but for good exposition of the views and critical discussion of these see Martin and Reidy (2006), Moellendorf (2002), and Tan (2004). Here I focus on just a few commonly identified points of tension between Rawls and his cosmopolitan critics.

In *The Law of Peoples*, Rawls engages directly with central claims made by some cosmopolitans, namely, those who argue that the Difference Principle should apply globally. He takes up Beitz's claim that, since a global system of cooperation already exists between states, a Global Difference Principle should apply across states as well. Rawls argues against this, for a couple of reasons, but notably, because he believes that wealth owes its origin and maintenance to the political culture of the society rather than (say) to its stock of resources. Furthermore, any global principle of distributive justice we endorse must have a target and a cut-off point. Rawls believes we do have a duty "to assist burdened societies to become full members of the Society of Peoples and to be able to determine the path of their own future for themselves" (1999, 118). Unlike his understanding of cosmopolitan commitments to a Global Difference Principle, Rawls believes his principles have a target, which is to ensure the essentials of political autonomy and self-determination.

Rawls's *Law of Peoples* has generated much criticism. One of the most frequently raised objections is that the background picture Rawls invokes incorporates outmoded views of relations between states, peoples, and individuals of the world. Rawls presupposes that states are (sufficiently) independent of one another, so that each society can be held largely responsible for the well-being of its citizens, at least in the case of well-ordered peoples (that is, those reasonable, liberal, and decent (p. 590) peoples not suffering unfavorable conditions). Furthermore, according to Rawls, differences in levels of wealth and prosperity are largely attributable to differences in political culture and the virtuous nature of its citizens. Critics point out, however, that Rawls ignores both the extent to which unfavorable conditions may result from factors external to the society and that there are all sorts of morally relevant connections between states, notably that they are situated in a global economic order that perpetuates the interests of wealthy developed states with little regard for the interests of poor, developing ones. Those of us who live in

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the affluent, developed world cannot thus defensibly insulate ourselves from the misery of the worst off in the world, because we are complicit in keeping them in a state of poverty.

Thomas Pogge has done much to show the nature and extent of these incriminating connections (1994, 2001, 2002, *inter alia*). According to Pogge, two international institutions are particularly worrisome: the international borrowing privilege and the international resource privilege. Any group that exercises effective power in a state is recognized internationally as the legitimate government of that territory, and the international community is not much concerned with how the group came to power or what it does with that power. Oppressive governments may borrow freely on behalf of the country (the international borrowing privilege) or dispose of its natural resources (the international resource privilege), and these actions are legally recognized internationally. These two privileges have enormous implications for the prosperity of poor countries (for instance) because these privileges provide incentives for coup attempts, they often influence what sorts of people are motivated to seek power, they facilitate oppressive governments being able to stay in power, and, should more democratic governments get to be in power, they are saddled with the debts incurred by their oppressive predecessors, thus significantly draining the country of resources needed to firm up fledgling democracies. All of this is disastrous for many poor countries. Because foreigners benefit so greatly from the international resource privilege, they have an incentive to refrain from challenging the situation (or worse, to support or finance oppressive governments). For these sorts of reasons, the current world order largely reflects the interests of wealthy and powerful states. Local governments have little incentive to attend to the needs of the poor, since their being able to continue in power depends more on the local elite, foreign governments, and corporations. Those of us in affluent developed countries have a responsibility to stop imposing this unjust global order and to mitigate the harms we have already inflicted on the world's most vulnerable people. As an initial proposal for us to begin to make some progress in the right direction, Pogge suggests that we impose a global resources tax of roughly 1 percent to fund improvements to the lives of the worst off in developing societies (Pogge 1994).

So, critics point out that Rawls ignores the extent to which societies suffering unfavorable conditions frequently results from factors external to that society, and that national policies are often shaped, or even decided by, international factors. They also argue that the boundedness and separateness of political communities is difficult to sustain in our world today, due to phenomena such as globalization and (p. 591) integration (Hurrell 2001). Rawls assumes we can talk coherently of bounded political communities that can constitute self-sufficient schemes of political cooperation. However, critics argue this is an untenable assumption. Some authors concentrate on showing that we actually have a system of global cooperation between societies and how this would give rise to obligations to the worst off (Hinsch 2001). Others believe that it is insulting to characterize the relations between states of the world as cooperative, since in reality the relationship is rather one of domination and coercion (Forst 2001).

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Several critics, then, argue that the basic global structure is a scheme of coercive institutions that importantly affects individuals' life prospects. It should be transformed so that it becomes a fair scheme of cooperation among all citizens of the world. For many of these critics, this is best modeled by considering a global original position in which decision makers have no knowledge of any morally arbitrary features, including country of citizenship. Using this kind of strategy, popular claims are that we should endorse a Global Difference Principle (permitting economic inequalities just in case they work to improve the situation of the worst off in the world) or Global Equality of Opportunity, though other options, such as arguing for a needs-based minimum floor account of global distributive justice, are also attractive (Brock 2005).

Several other kinds of criticisms are also voiced, including that the notion of a people is not sufficiently clear or important to do the work Rawls thinks it can do (Pogge 1994; Kuper 2000). Furthermore, since Rawls often takes the boundaries of states to mark off distinct peoples, his view runs into difficulties. If we take a people to be constituted by commonalities such as shared language, culture, history, or ethnicity, then the official state borders and peoples do not coincide well. National territories are not typically composed of a single people, nor is it clear that individuals belong to one and only one people (Pogge 1994).

Another common observation is that Rawls's arguments for his abridged list of human rights is defective. For one thing, critics charge that Rawls's failure to include democratic rights is quite mistaken. Amartya Sen, for instance, provides extensive evidence to support the claim that nondemocratic regimes have severely adverse consequences for the well-being and human rights of those over whom they rule (1999, 147–148, 154–155). Sen also argues that respect for human rights and ideas of democracy are not simply Western values, but rather that substantial elements of these ideas can be found in all major cultures, religions, and traditions.

Rawls argues for a respectful relationship between states (as representatives of peoples). Indeed, he argues that liberal democratic regimes have an obligation to deal with illiberal decent hierarchical regimes as equals, and not to endeavor to impose their values on them. Some might think that Rawls's views appropriately acknowledge the importance of our cultural or national affiliations. Andrew Kuper (2000) argues that Rawls may take cultural pluralism seriously but he does this at the expense of taking seriously the reasonable pluralism of *individual persons*. Well-ordered hierarchical societies may well contain individuals who hold liberal ideas. Rawls's account incorporates the wrong kind of toleration for such societies at the (p. 592) expense of liberal values. Rawls's view is not sufficiently sensitive to the individuals within states. Indeed, it would seem that Rawls, in defending nonliberal states as he has, would be forced to defend the rights of states to impose inegalitarian policies on its citizens, even if a majority of the citizens were vigorously against such policies (Blake 2005, 23).

Rawls aims at a realistic utopia, but critics charge that the result is neither sufficiently realistic nor utopian (e.g., Kuper 2000). It is not sufficiently realistic because, critics claim, he has not taken account of all the relevant realities, for instance, of interdependence or domination in the global arena. To the extent that he has not captured all the salient realities, his Law of Peoples is not as “workable” and likely to sustain ongoing cooperative political arrangements and relations between peoples. Furthermore, the view is not very utopian in that the political (moral) ideals used are too tame to constitute much of an advance over the status quo. In his bow to realism, Rawls has tried to ensure that the Law of Peoples results in stability, yet the Law of Peoples he endorses is potentially very unstable because, arguably, stability is only really achieved when just arrangements are in place, and Rawls has offered us nothing more than a *modus vivendi* with oppressor states.

Reconciling Cosmopolitanism with Other Commitments

Can cosmopolitans take account of the special attachments and commitments that fill ordinary human beings' lives with value and meaning?

A common misconception about cosmopolitanism concerns how a cosmopolitan must view her relations to those in local or particular communities, namely, that she must eschew such attachments in favor of some notion of impartial justice that the individual must apply directly to all, no matter where they are situated on the globe. But this is by no means entailed by several of the sophisticated accounts of cosmopolitanism on offer today (see, for instance, Brock and Brighouse 2005). Indeed, most contemporary cosmopolitans recognize that for many people, some of their most meaningful attachments in life derive from their allegiances to particular communities, be they national, ethnic, religious, or cultural. Their accounts often seek to define the legitimate scope for such partiality, by situating these in a context that clarifies our obligations to one another. Cosmopolitan justice provides the basic framework or structure and thereby the constraints within which legitimate patriotism may operate (see, for instance, Tan 2004, 2005). Cosmopolitan principles should govern the global institutions, such that these treat people as equals in terms of their entitlements (regardless of nationality and power, say). However, once the background global institutional structure is just, persons may defensibly favor the interests of their compatriots (or conationals, or other more particular groups), as long as such partiality does not conflict with their other obligations, for instance, to support global institutions. So cosmopolitan principles should govern the global institutions, but need not directly regulate what choices people may make within the rules of the institutions. One of the strengths of Tan's view is that even though cosmopolitan justice provides the justification for the limits of partiality toward group

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members, the value of those attachments is not reduced to cosmopolitan considerations, which is arguably a flaw with other attempts (e.g., Nussbaum 1996).

A simple way to show how there is a gap between the cosmopolitan's position and what antic cosmopolitans fear is this. Cosmopolitanism is essentially committed to these two central ideas: first, the equal moral worth of all individuals, no matter where they happen to be situated on the planet and what borders separate them from one another. Second, there are some obligations that are binding on all of us, no matter where we are situated. But acknowledging these two ideas still leaves plenty of room to endorse additional obligations, which derive from more particular commitments, and the preference some may have to spend discretionary resources and time on particular communities or attachments important to one's life plans and projects. In order to know just what constitutes our discretionary resources, and what our basic obligations to one another are, **we need the input of cosmopolitan justice**. So long as we act in ways consistent with those commitments, there are no residual ethical concerns. Whether or not there is still room for conflict depends on how much is packed into cosmopolitan justice. Very strong forms of egalitarian duties might leave little room; weaker ones might leave more. And yet we can appreciate that conceptually, at least, there is no tension here as feared.⁴

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Notes:

(1.) For an excellent history of cosmopolitanism, see Pauline Kleingeld 2006.

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(2.) For an overview of some of this debate see Brock and Brighouse 2005 and Brock and Moellendorf 2005.

(3.) More information about this organization can be found at their official home page: <http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/>.

(4.) Recall that this sort of solution to the issue of how our global responsibilities can be reconciled with our local ones applies primarily to the issue of global *distributive* justice. Other principles may certainly be overlaid on these to deal with rectifying past injustices. For more discussion on how to reconcile particular and cosmopolitan commitments see, for instance, Brock 2002.

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